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"After a whirlwind season of last-second scoring, game-winning touchdown runs,
stomach-turning rivalries and, yes, the return of instant replay, throwing a fantastic
Super Bowl party is the only way to say goodbye to NFL action for the year."1

INTRODUCTION
Rule 1: "The single-most important detail in planning a Super Bowl party is to
"2
first estabhlish a guest list.

Since its inception in 1967, 3 the National Football League's (hereinafter "NFL")
Super Bowl has rapidly emerged as one of the nation's most anticipated annual
events. 4 Unlike other sporting championships, it has entered the repertoire of
American holidays, spawning a national tradition that has transformed the way in

which people watch a game. The Super Bowl, celebrated every year on a Sunday in
late January or early February, engages millions of people from across the country to
5
gather in annual winter revelry.
Rule 2.

"[Aillow the more seriousfan better viewing access."

6

For many fans, a Super Bowl party demands a professional touch.

Over the

years, bars and restaurants have acted on consumer demand by hosting parties that
* J.D. Candidate, January 2006, The John Marshal Law School, Chicago, Illinois; B.A. English,
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. The author wishes to thank the editors at RIPL;
Madelene Tubalinal for her unwavering patience; Professors Mark Wojcik, Doris Long, and Robert
Nye; and particularly his parents for their dedicated support.
I Nicole Coward, Super Bowl Party Tips, NFL For Her: The Complete Football Playbook for
Women, at http://ww2.nfl.com/fans/forher/sb-partytips.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2004)[hereinafter
Party Tips]. The website is part of the National Football League's fan section. Id. The article, used
primarily for satirical purposes, highlights the NFL's own encouragement of Super Bowl parties
verses its prohibition of commercially organized events.
2 _d.
This year's Super Bowl was on February 1, 2004. SuperBowl.com, Super Bowl Recaps, at
http://www.superbowl.com/history/recaps (last visited Aug. 13, 2004). The first Super bowl was on
January 15, 1967. Id.
4 NFL.com, Super Bow] Sunday Fun Facts, at http://ww2.nfl.com/fans/forher/sb-funfacts.html
(last visited Aug. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Fun Facts]. Anyone underestimating the scale of the typical
Super Bowl Sunday should consider the following: the Super Bowl surpasses New Year's Eve as the
top, at-home, party event. Id. The Super Bowl ranks second, behind Thanksgiving, as the largest
food consumption day. Id. Of the ten most watched television moments of all time, nine include
Super Bowl broadcasts. Id. During Super Bowl weekend, the sale of large screen televisions
increases by a factor of five. Id. Super Bowl weekend records the least number of weddings than
any other calendar date. Id.
RId.
Coward, supranote 1.
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increase fans' enjoyment and provide increased access to the game. 7 In January of
2004, from the Orleans to the Aladdin, from the Stardust to the Palms, the city of Las
Vegas was preparing for one of its greatest draws of the year.
In a nationally aired commercial, still-images of a crowded football stadium were
narrated with the following: "[tloday they're playing the biggest game of the year.
Hundreds of thousands of fans are on the edge of their seats, living and dying with
every play, going nuts on every snap."8 As a scene of cheering fans in the stadium
faded into an image of the desert skyline, the commercial ended: "[if only it was this
exciting at the game in Houston." 9

Rule 3. cKnowing who is invited and who will be attending can help you to
decide the theme, the menu, and the level of sophistication."10
For the past decade, the city of Las Vegas has been a desert oasis for football
fans who cannot find tickets to the big game.
During this year's Super Bowl, an
estimated 274,000 people chose the city as their party headquarters, over twice the
amount of people that traveled to the host city, Houston, Texas. 12 The appeal lies
7

Dana Wagner, NFL Cracking Down On Game Parties In Vegas, KVBC-TV, available at

http://www.kvbc.com/Global/story.asp?s=%/200%201624444 (last visited Aug. 13, 2004). One couple,
who traveled from Albuquerque, New Mexico, to Las Vegas, Nevada, to watch the game summed up
the sentiment of those who travel for a free television broadcast, "It's more realistic on a big screen.
What if we get a bad seat? At least on a big screen, you can see it from far back if you get a bad
seat." Id.
8 Rebecca Flass, Vegas Tourism's Super Bowl Ads Aren't on CBS, Adweek, Jan. 13, 2004,
available in LEXIS, News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, Adweek (last visited Oct.
24, 2004). Two versions of the commercial were made and constituted a $1.5 million effort by the
Las Vegas Convention & Visitors Authority to promote the city as an alternate hot spot to the Super
Bowl's Houston location. Id. The commercials ran on Bravo, Comedy Central, E!, ESPN, ESPN 2,
and MSNBC. Id. The commercials came on the heels of last years rejection by the NFL to air any
Las Vegas related advertisements during its Super Bowl. Id.
9 Id.

10Coward, supranote 1.
11Christina Almelda, Vegas Hotels CancelingSuper Bowl Parties(Jan. 31, 2004) [hereinafter
Vegas Canceling, available at http://story.news.yahoo.com/news. Casino Super Bowl parties have
been held in Las Vegas for approximately ten years. Id. See also Liz Benston, Casinos Cash in on
Super
Bowl
Fans,
Casino
City
Times,
(Jan.
30
2004),
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-01-31 -vegas-super-bowl-parties x.htm (Jan. 31, 2004)
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004). Bill Mandel, publisher of Viva Las Vegas consumer newsletter stated,
"Everybody comes out [to Las Vegas] for the Super Bowl ... [y]ou're better off watching the game in
Las Vegas for the social aspect. Where else can you see the game and get food and drinks for 10
bucks?" Id. "The NFL has been issuing letters to casinos and other venues, warning them of
potential copyright infringement if they turn a Super Bowl party into something resembling a Pay
Per View event." Id. Interestingly however, this is certainly not the first time that people have
organized out-of-home viewings. In 1962, one group, in order to avoid "blacked out" television
broadcasts, organized trips to watch a football game. See Blaich v. NFL, 212 F. Supp. 319, 324 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) "One enterprising company has arranged a package tour from New York to
Philadelphia and return to view the game on television at Philadelphia at a price of $ 15, to include
brunch." Id.
12 Benston, supra note 11. An estimated 274,000 Super Bowl fans made the weekend trip to
Las Vegas, based on "on an average hotel occupancy rate of 91.7 percent -- up from 256,000 visitors
and an average occupancy rate of 88.2 percent last year, according to the Las Vegas Convention and
Visitors Authority." Id. [A]ccording to figures from the Gaming Control Board, bets placed on the
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deeper than wagering on a winning team. 13 Las Vegas has vigorously promoted itself
as an alternate gathering spot for numerous events, ranging from the National
Basketball Association finals and Major League Baseball's World Series, to the
14
Grammy Awards and Academy Awards.
Rule 4: IThere is nothing worse than being interruptedin the middle of the
game .... "15
Only days before kickoff, proprietors within several cities began receiving ceaseand-desist letters from the NFL. 16 The NFL claimed that proprietors' Super Bowl
parties constituted "unauthorized use of NFL intellectual property."17 According to
the NFL, determining factors of infringement include: "the location's size, whether
TV screens were larger than 55 inches, and whether people had to pay to get in."18 In
the wake of the sudden restrictions, some event organizers scrambled to comply with
the NFL's demands, while others simply had to shut down. 19
game generated $73 million. Id. Visitors are projected to spend "$97 million on rooms, dining, retail
and other non gambling activities, up from $90.8 million a year ago." Id. Non-gambling revenue is
due greatly to "the proliferation of parties and other events" that has steadily increased every year.

Id.
':13
Id.
14 Flass,

supra note 8.
15 Coward, supranote 1.
16 Vegas Canceling supra note 11.
While the letters generated the most attention in Las
Vegas, proprietors in other cities received the NFL's letter as well, including: Charlotte, North
Carolina; Houston, Texas; and Boston, Massachusetts. Id.
17 Id.
I8 Id.
While the author of this Comment did contact the NFL's legal counsel and spoke with
the author of these letters, a requested copy was denied. However, the NFL's counsel stated that
the letter simply informed the recipient of 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (A) and (B). See Vegas Canceling,
supra note 11. Mayor Oscar Goodman believed Las Vegas was being unfairly targeted, charging
that the league had allowed "a condition to exist for the past 10 years and then they want to change
the rules two days before." Id. NFL spokesman, Brian McCarthy, denied Las Vegas was being
singled out, noting the other cities which had received the letter. Id. See also Ralph Siraco, NFLs
Late Hit on Casino Isn't the First,Daily Racing Form, Jan. 31, 2004, availablein LEXIS, News &
Business, Wire Service Stories (last visited Oct. 24, 2004). The NFL and Las Vegas have battled
primarily over gambling and advertising in the past. Id. The city has made numerous attempts to
place ads during football games, attempts the league has repeatedly rejected, in order to maintain a
distance from images of gambling. I-d. However, several years ago the NFL began charging Nevada
casinos a fee for showing a full schedule of games. Id. While casinos first resisted the payments,
proprietors eventually acquiesced. Id.
'9 Las Vegas Review
Journal, Super Bowl Parties (Feb. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/superbowl/parties.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2004). There
were approximately four Las Vegas hotels that publicly cancelled their Super Bowl parties. Id.
Hotels such as the Aladdin and Luxor simply stated that "[d]ue to restrictions from the National
Football League," the hotel's party would be cancelled. Id. The Orleans cancelled its party, which
included the band Blue Oyster Cult, but stated that the game could still be watched in the casino,
which would offer food and beverage specials. Id. The Palms cancelled its party in Brenden
Theatres, but stated that "guests who have purchased tickets may watch the game on large screen
televisions in an alternate venue at no charge and will receive free hot dogs and free draft beer." Id.
See also Wagner, supra note 7. In light of those who ignored the NFL's letter, the league warned
that it planned on having "enforcement people" at the targeted hotel casinos. Id. Any establishment
found to be in breach could expect a lawsuit to be filed. Id. See also Vegas Canceling supra note 11.
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CopyrightLa w: From Music to Television
The confusion generated by the NFL's actions is rooted in laws regarding music.
The fundamental issue is the determination of what constitutes a "public
performance." 20 In 1998, Congress produced its most recent refinement of the public
performance doctrine, The Fairness in Music Licensing Act (hereinafter FMLA).21
Included was a restriction on televisions, specifically, those with a diagonal screen
size greater than fifty-five inches. 22 The NFL's interpretation of the FMLA led it to
believe that the casinos' use of large-screen televisions was an infringement upon its
23
intellectual property rights.
The law's arrival at its current state is a result of following a long and embattled
path through both the courts and Congress. The goal of this comment is to explore
the evolution of the modern public performance doctrine and analyze the laws that
have upset the delicate balance of copyright law.
Part A of the background section provides a brief historical overview of copyright
law before 1976,24 beginning with the Constitution. Part B examines the first United
States Supreme Court cases to deal with rising technology and the creation of a new
public performance doctrine. Part C discusses the 1976 Copyright Act; it will
examine the fundamental nature of the doctrinal shift in copyright law, as well as the
creation of 17 U.S.C. § 110(5). Part D then discusses the additions made to § 110(5)
in 1998, including the fifty-five inch screen limitation as initially put forth and
lobbied for by special-interest groups.
Part I1 uncovers the key difference between free radio and television broadcasts
not contemplated during the creation of 1976 Copyright Act. Part IV then examines
the fair use exemptions and discusses how each is inadequate and perhaps even
unconstitutional. Part V applies the fair use analysis specifically to circumstances of
the Las Vegas casinos. Finally, Part VI explores an equitable solution achieved by
redrafting the public performance doctrine.

Promoter Todd Krohn estimated the cancellation cost to his company, T & J Trust, at over $100,000.

Id. The party was set to host 6,000 people at $45 per ticket. Id.
20 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
The simplest illustration of a public performance is a singer
performing on stage in front of a live audience. The significance is that when the performance
consists of a copyrighted work, in this case a copyrighted song, the author of that song (the copyright
holder) is entitled to a royalty payment from the performer.
21 See Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2830-31 (1998)
(codified in principle part at 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2000)).
22 Id.
See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)(i)(IJ)(2000).
23 See Vegas Canceling, supra note 11.
The NFL also took issue with casinos charging
admission for "something we are offering for free." Id. Once the admission fees to the parties were
waived, the television size became the primary issue. Id.
24 In 1976 Congress undertook extensive efforts to create a comprehensive body of copyright

[4:125 2004]

Football's Intellectual Side

I. BACKGROUND

A. CopyrightLaw Before 1976
The foundation of all patent and copyright laws is the United States
Constitution. 25 The Constitution states, "Congress shall have the power . . .To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 26 This simple declaration charged Congress with a complex task: to
protect the genius of an author, while promoting the progress of an enlightened
society. 27 In order to strike a balance between those ideals, it became necessary to
enact laws capable of providing both a "limited monopoly" 28 and sufficient public
access. 29 While an author maintains a general right of exclusion, 30 a system of fair
31
compensation provides incentive to share the authored work with the public.
For over one hundred years, Congress intentionally left the copyright laws vague
and charged the courts with defining the subtle boundaries. 32 It was not until 1897
that Congress began regulating "public performance" of a copyrighted work. 33 The
invention of the radio allowed performances historically relegated to the stage to be
broadcast to the masses. As a result, the potential for royalties caused copyright
holders to question the extent to which a radio transmission was a "public
performance".

25 U.S.

CONST. art. I,

§ 8,

cl. 1, 8.

26 Id.
27See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 229 (1990).

Although dissemination of creative works is a goal of the Copyright Act, the Act
creates a balance between the artist's right to control the work during the term of
the copyright protection and the public's need for access to creative works. The
copyright term is limited so that the public will not be permanently deprived of
the fruits of an artist's labors.

Id.

Id. at 229.
Id. at 229.
30 See generally CSU, L.L.C. v Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1329 (2000)("exclusionary conduct
28
29

can include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a copyright ....").
31 Seo Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (holding that, "[i]ndeed, copyright's purpose
is to promote the creation and publication of free expression.").
32 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
33 Soe White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
There, the court
considered the nature of perforated paper rolls used in mechanical "player pianos." Id. at 10. The
rolls were made by defendant, and each perforation represented a harmonic note of the copyrighted
musical composition. Id. at 11. Perhaps in one of the first copyright cases involving a remote
performance, the court stated:
The amendment of § 4966 by the act of January 6, 1897, 29 Stat. 481, 3 U.S.
Comp. Stat. 3415, providing a penalty for any person publicly performing or
representing any dramatic or musical composition for which a copyright has been
obtained . . . . The purpose of the amendment evidently was to put musical
compositions on the footing of dramatic compositions so as to prohibit their public
performance.
Id. at 16. However, the court ultimately held the rolls to be non-infringing. Id.
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B. JudicialAnalysis of the PerformanceDoctrine

1. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.
One of the first major cases to deal with the public performance doctrine was
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.3 4 The American Society of Composers Authors and
Publishers (hereinafter "ASCAP") 5 sued the Jewell-LaSalle Realty Company
(hereinafter "LaSalle").36 At the time, LaSalle operated the LaSalle Hotel in Kansas
City, Kansas. 37 The hotel had a central radio-receiving unit that played music
38
throughout the lobby and private guest rooms.
Wilson Duncan operated an unlicensed radio station.39 The station repeatedly
broadcasted plaintiffs copyrighted songs, "Just Imagine" and "I'm Winging Home
(Like a Bird that is on the Wing)," which were subsequently played over the LaSalle
radio. 40 Plaintiff contended that the broadcast of his copyrighted music via radio
waves constituted an infringement by the radio station and contributory
41
infringement by the LaSalle Hotel.
Under the public performance doctrine of the 1909 Copyright Act, a copyright
holder had exclusive rights "[to perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it
be a musical composition." 42 Under this guidance, both the district court 43 and the
Supreme Court 44 held that the defendant radio station had publicly performed the
45
author's compositions without a proper license.

34 Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
3, The American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (hereinafter "ASCAP"),
Broadcast Music, Inc. (hereinafter "BMI"), and The Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers are collectively known as "royalty societies."
See generally About ASCAP at
http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2004). ASCAP, created in 1914, is perhaps best
described in their own words:
ASCAP is a membership association of over 190,000 U.S. composers, songwriters,
lyricists, and music publishers of every kind of music. ASCAP protects the rights
of its members by licensing and distributing royalties for the non-dramatic public
performances of their copyrighted works. ASCAP's licensees encompass all who
want to perform copyrighted music publicly.
Id.
36 Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 195.
37 Id.
3'8Id.
3 Id9
40Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366, 368 (D. Mo. 1929). Buck v. Duncan was the district court case
ultimately heard by the Supreme Court as Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. See Jewell-LaSalle,
283 U.S. at 195.
41 Duncan, 32 F.2d 366 at 368.
12 Id.
See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (replaced by
the Copyright Act of 1976).
43Duncan, 32 F.2d at 368.
41Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931).
45Id. Duncan, 32 F.2d at 368.
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Often misinterpreted, Jewell-LaSalle held that the radio station's liability
affected subsequent receivers of the unlicensed transmission. 46 At the district level,
the court interpreted the radio station's broadcast as a distinct and separate act from
LaSalle's radio reception. 47 The district court held the radio station liable; however,
it concluded that the hotel's "reception of a musical composition on a radio
48
receiver [was] not a performance at all."

16 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976).
Congress later took the Jewel]-LaSalle opinion as its
basis for the creation of 17 U.S.C. § 110(5). Id. In the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act,
Congress stated:
For more than forty years the Jewell-LaSalle rule was thought to require a
business establishment to obtain copyright licenses before it could legally pick up
any broadcasts off the air and re-transmit them to its guests and patrons. As
reinterpreted by the Aiken decision, the rule of Jewell-LaSa]e applies only if the
broadcast being retransmitted was itself unlicensed.
Id. However, the Jewell-LaSalle court plainly states, "[i]f the copyrighted composition had been
broadcast by Duncan with plaintiffs' consent, a license for its commercial reception and distribution
by the hotel company might possibly have been implied." Id. at 199 n.5. The court notes however,
"Duncan was not licensed; and the position of the hotel company is not unlike that of one who
publicly performs for profit by the use of an unlicensed phonograph record." Id. "[W]e have no
occasion to determine under what circumstances a broadcaster [would] be held to be a performer, or
the effect upon others of his paying a license fee." Id. at 198. The court calls the reader to compare
the outcome of Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929), which does adjudicate the "licensed
broadcaster" scenario. Id. at 199 n.5. The Debaum court held:
[H]ere the broadcasting station was licensed and expressly authorized by owners
of the copyright to publicly perform for profit, by broadcasting or otherwise, the
copyrighted musical composition, and, in my opinion, it is the grant of such
privilege or license by the owners of the copyright to the broadcasting station that
is the determining factor that disables the complainants herein from enjoining or
preventing the defendant from "picking up" through his radio receiving set the
"Indian Love Call," and imparting the same audibly to the patrons of his cafe ....
It seems to me to be clear that, when plaintiffs licensed the broadcasting station
to disseminate the "Indian Love Call," they impliedly sanctioned and consented to
any "pick up" out of the air that was possible in radio reception.
Debaum, 40 F.2d at 735.

47See

Dehaurn, 40 F.2d at 735.

48Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366, 367 (D. Mo. 1929). The Duncan court found:

The right to perform a musical composition is the right to translate that musical
composition into waves of sound or waves of ether for the enjoyment of those who
are enabled either by natural or artificial means to receive the auditory
sensations those waves are calculated to produce. The right to perform a musical
composition does not carry with it a proprietary interest in the waves that go out
upon the air or upon the ether. They are as much the common property of all as
the sunshine and the zephyr.
If I throw open a window so that I can hear the music of a band passing by, am I
producing that music? Am I then the performer or participating in the
performance? If I lift a telephone receiver and hear the voice of a friend, am I
producing that voice? Is it my speech or his? If in perfect analogy to these
illustrations, by mechanical means, I receive as music what has been produced
elsewhere in such a way that it penetrates my house, I am not the performer who
has produced that music.

[4:125 2004]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

The Supreme Court's analysis differed sharply from the lower court's
4
interpretation. The Court viewed the broadcast as one successive transmission. 9
This meant that liability from an unlicensed broadcast would carry to each
subsequent receiver of that broadcast because "[i]ntention to infringe [is] not
essential under the [1909 Copyright] Act," so long as "the music [is] produced by
50
instrumentalities under [the listener's] control."
Thus, reception of an unlicensed transmission was an infringement regardless of
the receiver's knowledge that the transmission was unlicensed. This principal was
reinforced by the Court in an often-overlooked footnote, which states that a licensed
radio transmission might imply a license for public reception. 51 The Court's
reasoning came from a strict interpretation of the 1909 Copyright Act. The statute
did not explicitly state that "a single rendition of a copyrighted selection [cannot
result] in more than one public performance for profit." 52
53
suggested why there may not be more than one liability."

Thus, "[n]o reason is

9 Jeweil-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 198. The Court stated that reception, and thus performance, of
an unauthorized transmission incurs liability, regardless of the party's willfulness or knowledge of
the act. -d. at 198-199.
50 Id. at 201. Under this logic, the court suggested that to be free of liability meant keeping
one's radio off. Id. This also gave rise to the multiple performance doctrine, wherein a copyright
holder could demand payment from every entity that in any way comes in contact with the
transmitted signal, regardless of whether it is converted to an audible form. Id. The Court in
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 162-163 (1975), stated:
[T]o hold that all in Aiken's position "performed" these musical compositions
would be to authorize the sale of an untold number of licenses for what is
basically a single public rendition of a copyrighted work. The exaction of such
multiple tribute would go far beyond what is required for the economic protection
of copyright owners, and would be wholly at odds with the balanced congressional
purpose behind 17 U.S.C. § 1.
Id. See also David v. Showtime/Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ('[J]t
seems apparent from the scope of the examples provided in the legislative history that Congress
intended the definitions of 'public' and 'performance' to encompass each step in the process by which
a protected work wends its way to its audience."). See also Testimony Before the House Small
Business Committee on Music Licenses: Testimony of Stephen Barba President The Balsams Grand
Resort Hotel (May 8, 1996) wherein Mr. Barba stated:
I want to give you an example to be sure you understand what I mean by unfair
"double dipping." Think about when you see Michigan State's marching band play
a song at halftime of a nationally televised football game. Now guess how many
times ASCAP and BMI collect fees when that song is played over the air. Once?
Twice? Three times? No, they collect fees five times from five different sources
once each from the stadium, the national TV network, the local TV station, the
local cable system, and finally from the bar that is showing the game. That's not
double dipping, folks, that's quintuple dipping!
Id.
51See Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. 191,199 (1931)(noting that if the radio station had been
licensed, the hotel might have had an implied license).
52 Id. at 198. The court notes that:
While this may not have been possible before the development of radio
broadcasting, the novelty of the means used does not lessen the duty of the courts
to give full protection to the monopoly of public performance for profit which
Congress has secured to the composer.
Id.
o53Id.
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2. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken
Forty-four years after Jewell-LaSalle, the Supreme Court addressed a case
factually identical, less one essential element: this time, the radio broadcast was
licensed. In Twentieth CenturyMusie Corp. v. Aiken,54 the proprietor of a small fast55
food business, George Aiken, installed four speakers in the ceiling of his restaurant.
56
As in Jewell-LaSalle,the speakers were connected to a central radio.
On March 11, 1972, Mary Bourne's "Me and My Shadow," and Twentieth
Century Music's "The More I See You," were broadcast over the radio and received in
Aiken's restaurant. 57 Both copyright owners were members of ASCAP, which had
licensed the performance to a local radio station. 58 Aiken, however, did not hold an
individual license to perform the works. 59 When an ASCAP representative in Aiken's
60
restaurant heard the songs, ASCAP commenced a copyright infringement lawsuit.
Judicial precedent had firmly established that a radio broadcast was a "public
performance." 61 The question was whether a broadcaster's license implied
authorization of public reception. 62 The Court reasoned that if a radio station was
the "live performer," then "those who [listened] to the broadcast" were akin to the
audience. 63 At no point was it ever "contemplated that the members of the audience
who heard the composition would themselves also be simultaneously 'performing,'
and thus also guilty of infringement." 64 The Court found Mr. Aiken not liable
65
because he was a passive listener who had not performed the songs.
' Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
5 Id.
at 152.
56 Id. (stating that Aiken would turn on the radio "each morning at the start of business.
Music, news, entertainment, and commercial advertising broadcast by radio stations [were] thus
heard by Aiken, his employees, and his customers during the hours that the establishment [was]
open for business").
57 Id. at 152-53.
58 Id. at 153.
5o Id.
6o Id.

61 Id. at 158.
2IId. at 157.
63 Id. at 159.
64 Id.
at 157. Soe also Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (holding that the
importation of distant cable signals by local CATV (cable stations) is not a performance and thus
subsequent viewing by individuals is not a public performance); Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists, 392 U.S. 390 (1968). The court in Fortnight]ystated:
The television broadcaster in one sense does less than the exhibitor of a motion
picture or stage play; he supplies his audience not with visible images but only
with electronic signals. The viewer conversely does more than a member of a
theater audience; he provides the equipment to convert electronic signals into
audible sound and visible images. Despite these deviations from the conventional
situation contemplated by the framers of the Copyright Act, broadcasters have
been judicially treated as exhibitors, and viewers as members of a theater
audience. Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform. Thus, while both
broadcaster and viewer play crucial roles in the total television process, a line is
drawn between them. One is treated as active performer; the other, as passive
beneficiary.
Id. at 398-99. See also Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929) ["One who manually or by
human agency merely actuates electrical instrumentalities, whereby inaudible elements that are
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3. Aiken Preservesthe Jewell-LaSalle Holding
The Court reconciled its opinion in Aiken with its previous holding in JewellLaSalle.66 The crucial distinction was that in Jewell-LaSalle "the broadcaster of the
musical composition was not licensed to perform" the songs.67 Otherwise, "the
answer to [the] certified question might have been different if the broadcast itself had
been authorized by the copyright holder." 68 Thus, Aiken did not overrule JewellLaSalle, rather, it distinguished and preserved Jewell-LaSalle based on particular
69
facts.

C. The 1976 CopyrightAct
The 1976 Copyright Act reflected a fundamental shift in attitude toward the
public performance doctrine.70
Congress eliminated the judicial distinction of
omnipresent in the air are made audible to persons who are within hearing, does not 'perform'
within the meaning of the Copyright Law."]; Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric, 16 F.2d
829, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) ["Certainly those who listen do not perform, and therefore do not
infringe."].
65 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 164 (1975).
66 Id. at 160-61.
67 _d. at 160.
68 Id.
69 Looking beyond sta-re decisis, the Aiken court considered the practical implications of
holding for ASCAP. Id. at 162. Extending the performance definition to include the listener, "would
result in a regime of copyright law that would be both wholly unenforceable and highly inequitable."
7d. A listener in Aiken's situation could never be free from liability, unless he simply kept his radio
off. Id. Although he might obtain a performance license from ASCAP, it would only protect him
from infringing on ASCAP members. 7d. Unaffiliated copyright holders could independently license
with a radio station. Id. Extending the performance definition to a person like Mr. Aiken would
force individual licenses to be obtained from every independent copyright holder on the radio. 7d.
Not only was this impractical, but it nearly impossible. 7d. The court also concluded that a radio
broadcast of a song was a single public performance. Id. at 163-64. Authorizing copyright holders to
exact royalty payments from anyone receiving a broadcast would allow for an "untold number of
licenses." Id. at 163. It would exceed the fundamental intent of copyright law by shifting the
balance of a copyright holder's limited monopoly over the interest of public access. 7d. Congress
stated that:
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection accorded to music
has been to give to the composer an adequate return for the value of his
composition, and it has been a serious and a difficult task to combine the
protection of the composer with the protection of the public, and to so frame an act
that it would accomplish the double purpose of securing to the composer an
adequate return for all use made of his composition and at the same time prevent
the formation of oppressive monopolies, which might be founded upon the very
rights granted to the composer for the purpose of protecting his interests.
7d. at 163-64 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong. (1909)(emphasis added)). The equitable
solution, therefore, was to limit the performance definition to only include the broadcaster. Thus, a
radio station would license and pay royalties to the copyright holder. The listening audience would
then be free to use radios in public and private settings without fear of liability.
70 It has been established in this Comment that the JewollLaSalle and Aiken decisions do not
conflict, rather they are based on significantly different facts. However, Congress' interpretation
differed quite dramatically. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976). It found that '[t]he majority of the
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broadcasters as performers and receivers as non-performers. 71 The new definition of
a "public performance" in 17 U.S.C. § 101 stated that the performance began with the
original act and extended through all transmissions until perceived by the
recipient.72 The performance became public when it occurred at a place "open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal
73
circle of a family and its social acquaintances [were] gathered."
The definition makes virtually all receptions of radio or television broadcasts
74
outside of one's private use public performances and imposes liability accordingly.
To counter this sweeping effect, Congress created 17 U.S.C. § 110, which limited the
author's exclusive right to perform or display his work.7 5 The exemptions in § 110
includes displays or transmissions for educational purposes, 76 for religious
purposes, 77 for charitable purposes, 7 8 at sales conventions, 79 performances designed
81
for handicapped persons,80 and for nonprofit veteran's organizations.
Supreme Court in the Aiken case based its decision on a narrow construction of the word 'perform' in
the 1909 statute. This basis for the decision is completely overturned by the present bill and its
broad definition of 'perform' in section 101." Id. Instead, Congress accepted that "the traditional,
pre-Aiken, interpretation by means other than a home receiving set, or futher [sic] transmission of a
broadcast to the public, is considered an infringing act." Id. Compare H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 with
Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (building a community antenna to receive and
retransmit television signals to one's home does not alter the person's status as a "nonperformer")
andFortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390 (1968) ("Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not
perform.") and Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929) ("One who [turns on a radio], does not
'perform' within the meaning of the Copyright Law.") and Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. GE, 16 F.2d
829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) ("Certainly those who listen do not perform, and therefore do not infringe.").
7 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976).
72 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (stating "by means of any device or process," which would include "all
conceivable forms and combinations of wires and wireless communications media, including ...
radio and television").
73 Id. Here, the definition of family "would include an individual living alone, so that a
gathering confined to the individual's social acquaintances would normally be regarded as private."

Id. See generally John Kheit, Publie Performance Copyrights:A Guide to Publie Place Analysis,
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1999) (discussing through case law analysis the boundaries of
what constitutes a "public performance," "public display," and "family circle.").
71 See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000). Under this section of the copyright code entitled, "Remedies for

Infringement: Damages and Profits," the injured party may elect to recover actual damages and
profits made by the infringer, or statutory damages. Id. Actual damages are computed based on the
profits gained by infringer's appropriation the author's work. Id. Any time before final judgment
however, the plaintiff may elect to recover statutory damages ranging from $750 to $30,000
determined at the court's discretion. Id. Upon a showing of willful infringement, the statutory limit
increases to $150,000, whereas unknowing infringement lowers the minimum damages to $200. Id.
75 As created in 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) read:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not infringements
of copyright:
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a
work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus
of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless-(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public ....
17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1976)
76 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(1), 110(2) (2000).
77 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (2000).
78 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (2000).
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Under 17 U.S.C. § 110(5), Congress created an exemption for broadcasts
received in public.82 The aim was to exempt the use of commonly sold entertainment

equipment, whose "secondary use" would be so minimal that it did not require the
payment of a royalty.8 3 This assumed that home entertainment equipment used in
commercial establishments would bring an added benefit to those establishments, yet
the equipment's diminutive size would ensure that the benefit would never reach the
point at which an author expects compensation.8 4 Commercial establishments
utilizing receivers exceeding the "home-style" threshold would be required to pay a
85
license to render the copyrighted work.
Unfortunately, the legal simplicity offered by the court's public performance
doctrine was lost in the vagary of Congress' "home-style" statute.8 6 Interpreting the
act required a proprietor to know if their electronic equipment was similar to that
7) 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (2000). This statute is less of an exemption and focuses rather on limiting
the liability of event organizers of sale conventions. Id. The statute limits the organizer's liability,
but does not provide any performance exemptions for the individual concessionaires. Id. Under 17
U.S.C. § 110(7) (2000), the salesman who turns on a radio or television for a customer, with the sole
purpose of demonstrating the devices' features, or selling the aforesaid music, is free of liability . Id.
80 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(8), 110 (9) (2000).
81 17 U.S.C. § 110(10) (2000).
82 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2000).
8:3See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976). The intent by Congress in crafting the Home Style Act
was to "exempt from copyright liability anyone who merely turns on, in a public place, an ordinary

radio or television receiving apparatus of a kind commonly sold to members of the public for private
use." Id.
84 The difficulty at establishing the limit of secondary use is underlined by the beliefs of the
parties involved. ASCAP believes all use is significantly beneficial, claiming that, "Music is a vital
part of the total service businesses offer to customers. ASCAP's licensees recognize that using music
benefits their businesses because music, like other amenities or products, pays off in heightened
customer satisfaction, increased profits, and improved employee morale and productivity." See
About ASCAP Licensing, at http://www.ascap.com/licensing/about.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
ASCAP also asserts, "the music tempo is used to influence your buying decisions at the
supermarket, clothing or other store [sic]." Id. Also, "[m]usic-on-hold makes the time you are on
hold [on the telephone] pass more quickly and pleasantly." Id. ASCAP further delivers its belief by
asking, '[h]ave you ever been at a restaurant and wondered why it was so uncomfortable only to
later realize it was because you thought everyone could overhear your conversation? Music
surrounds you, creating the privacy you desire." Id. Restaurant owners undoubtedly question the
benefit assumed by songwriters, pointing out that no studies have ever quantitatively measured all
of ASCAP's assumed benefits. See Hearing of the Courts and Intellectual Prop. Subcomm. of the
House Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Music Licensing Hoarings]. Yet, in direct
contradiction of ASCAP's assumption of consumer "desire," one Congressman stated during hearings
regarding the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, "I've got to confess my own bias here. When I go into
a restaurant I either want to talk to somebody or read. And I would probably pay more if they'd shut
the darn thing [radio] off." Id.
85 See Music Licensing Hearings,supra note 84.
86 See, e.g., Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. GE, 16 F.2d 829 ("Certainly those who listen do not
perform, and therefore do not infringe. Can it be said with any greater reason that one who enables
others to hear participates in the unauthorized performance, so as to be a contributory infringer?
Surely not ....
). See also Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (holding that a listener does not
perform). Compare H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976). The 1976 Copyright act shifted the clear
distinction between a performer and non-performer to include the listener. Id. The new distinction
rested on a proprietor's equipment. Id. A legislative history shows that Congress could clarify
home-style only as "small commercial establishments whose proprietors merely bring onto their
premises standard radio or television equipment." Id.

[4:125 2004]

Football's Intellectual Side

used in the surrounding neighborhood8 7 or behind the closed doors of private homes.
This amounted to congressionally mandated clairvoyance on which royalty societies
were able to capitalize.88 If a plaintiff could show that a proprietor's equipment was
either modified or more sophisticated than the most commonly used equipment in
89
private homes at that time, the plaintiff would prevail.

D. The 1998 Fairnessin Music LicensingAct

1. A Limited-Use Statute
By the 1990's, influential copyright holders feared the release of their works into
the public domain.9 0 This prompted influential companies to lobby Congress to pass
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.9 1 In a strategic move, the National
Restaurant Association9 2 seized the bill in Congress to leverage power away from
what it viewed as predatory tactics on the behalf of royalty societies.9 3 Congress

87 See NFL v. Rondor, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 (N.D. Ohio 1993). Both plaintiffs and
defendants undertook surveys to prove to the court whether a bar's antenna equipment was of the
type used in the common home. Id. Evidence consisted of a "visual survey within the neighborhoods
in the general vicinities of the defendant establishments." Id. The "initial survey of 1,366 homes
looked for external antennas, rotors, and preamplifiers . . . an expanded survey of 4,776 homes was
completed by automobile, of which 2,223 [homes] had exterior antennas." Id.
88 See 2-8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18 (2003). "Following enactment of the 1976 Act, Section
110(5) became a lightning rod for litigation, which continued unabated during the first two decades
that the Act remained in effect." !-d.
89 It is difficult to determine the local standard because such determination requires
interrupting the privacy of a person's home. The standard simply cannot be identified, even by
plaintiffs. See generally Music Licensing Hearings, supra note 84. There has been testimony
regarding the licensing practices of music royalty societies and their diverging opinions on what is
home-style. !-d. "ASCAP and BMI take the position in various negotiations [,] or how they seek
licensing fees [] that it's either a 27-inch TV set or a 36-inch TV set. The societies themselves don't
agree." Id.
90 See Dennis Harney, Mickey Mousing The Copyright Clause of the US. Constitution:Eldred
v. Reno, 27 DAYTON L. REV. 291 (2002). One of the most prominent supporters of the extension of
the copyright monopoly was the Disney Corporation. Id. Its goal was to keep its character, Mickey
Mouse, from being freely used in the public domain, which in 1998 helped generate $8 billion for the
Disney Corporation. Id. at 304 n.83.
91 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended 17 U.S.C. §§§ 108, 203, 301-04) [hereinafter CTEA].
92 See generally Music Licensing Hearings, supra note 84.
The primary organization of
restaurant proprietors was the National Restaurant Association. Id. They were part of a "Music
Licensing Fairness Coalition" which represented restaurants, taverns, retail stores, and other
establishments. Id.
93 See Music Licensing Hearings, supra note 84. During committee meetings concerning the
Fairness in Music Licensing Act, it was suggested by Mr. Holyfield, speaking on behalf of ASCAP,
that,
ASCAP has repeatedly tried to negotiate a commercial settlement with the
[National Restaurant Association] as it has successfully done with the National
Licensed Beverage Association and dozens and dozens of other organizations. But
officials of the [National Restaurant Association] told us in 1995: We do not wish
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found itself hosting a settlement agreement between songwriters and restaurant
proprietors. 94 The result was a statute specifically limited to the use of music
95
broadcast over radio and television.

2. Specific Limitations
The statute, 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B), is split into two subsections, addressing
96
restaurants and "establishments," the only difference being the size of the building.
97
Establishments may be up to 2,000 square feet before § ii0(5)(B) applies.
Restaurants are afforded 3,750 square feet. 98 Any building under the respective size
limitations theoretically could have unrestricted use of television and radio
broadcasts. 99 Buildings above the stated size thresholds must adhere to a number of
specific limitations. 100
Under the statute's provisions, both restaurants and
establishments are limited to a total of six loudspeakers, with only four placed in any
one room or adjoining outdoor space. 10 1 They are also limited to a total of four
televisions, with a maximum of only one per room. 10 2 Furthermore, none of the
10 3
televisions can have a diagonal screen size greater than fifty-five inches.
Finally, § 110(5)(A) includes two important prohibitions. 10 4 Proprietors may not
directly charge patrons to see or hear a broadcast. 10 5 Likewise, proprietors cannot

to negotiate with you under any circumstances. They still refuse to negotiate.
They insist on legislation in what should be a commercial dispute.
Id. The seizure of the Copyright Term Extension Act stalled passage of the bill for more than three
years. See 28 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18 (2003).
94 See 2-8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18(2)(a) (2003).
95 Id. at § 8.18(b)(i) First, the 1998 Act "is limited to the realm of music." Id. Why then does
the act include explicit limitations on televisions? Because the audio component of a television
broadcast can include nondramatic musical works. Id. For example, if a television broadcast
includes a copyrighted song or a movie soundtrack, the exemption applies. Id. This also means,
"that the exemption here will not apply to other copyrighted aspects of the audiovisual work at
issue.., such as football games." Id.
96 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)(i) (2000).
97 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)(iii) (2000).
98

17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)(ii) (2000).

99 See Music Licensing Hearings,supra note 84.
REP. GOODLATTE: Is there a size of bar or tavern below which there is no fee?
MS. LEACH: For live or previous -REP. GOODLATTE: No, for radios and television.
MS. LEACH: Yes. That's the 3,500 square feet. If they are below that and they
only have radio and television, they are totally exempt from licensing fees.
Id.
100 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2000).
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make further retransmissions to the public. 10 6 Unlike § 110(5)(A), § 110(5)(B)
1 7
explicitly states that all broadcasted works must be licensed by the author.

11.

ANALYSIS

After studying viewing habits, utilizing ratings technology, and feeling economic
pressure, the NFL turned to copyright law as a means to an end. It capitalized on
Congress' ever-increasing shift of copyright laws that favor the interests of the
author at the direct expense of the public. For business proprietors in the city of Las
Vegas, who expected almost $100 million in non-gambling revenue during Super
Bowl weekend,108 this expense has become very real.
Current copyright laws inadequately protect fair-use of television broadcasts
because those laws were written by and for the music industry. 10 9 This creates a
three-fold problem. First, copyright laws fail to account for the differences in
payment structure between free radio and television broadcasts. 110 This allows
copyright owners to influence how the public watches television. Second, there is an
inherent assumption that the author of a copyrighted work will grant a license for a
public performance in return for a royalty payment.1 11 This shortsighted assumption
11 2
allows broadcasters the power to control where the public watches television.
Third, remaining law designed to protect the fair-use of non-music television
broadcasts (such as sporting events), is unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory.

106 17

107

U.S.C. § 110(5)(A)(ii) (2000).

Id. What is unclear however, is how the new statute alters § 110(5)(A). Under 17 U.S.C. §

110(5) two subsections now exist, one exempting home-style equipment while the other exempts an
arbitrary number of speakers and televisions in a room. While section (B) is rigid in its fifty-five
inch limitation, section (A), the home-style act, is a sliding scale, determined by the most common
device used. Thus, it is conceivable that a sixty-inch television could be home-style, and its use
would run in conflict with section (B).
108Benston, supranote 11.
109 Soo Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 885-86 (1987). Almost a decade before the Aiken decision, the Register of Copyrights was
drafting sections of what would become the 1976 Copyright Act. !-d. Although the initial drafts of
the performance definition were similar to the 1909 Act, industry representatives were able to
influence the narrower fair-use exemptions of the 1976 Act, as well as inflate "expansive definitions
of 'perform' and 'perform publicly."' Id.
110Although the relationship between a copyright owner, broadcaster, and advertiser are
generally the same between radio and television, the method of collecting viewer ratings is different.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
HI See United States v. ASCAP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23707, *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Music
royalty societies, such as ASCAP, may not deny a license "in order to exact additional consideration
for the performance thereof, or for the purpose of permitting the fixing or regulating of fees for the
recording or transcribing of such work ....
" -Id. This provision does not restrict ASCAP from
denying a license upon the direct order of an individual songwriter, "in order reasonably to protect
the work against indiscriminate performances .. " Id.
112 This is accomplished by simply denying commercial properties the right to perform the
author's televised work.
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A. CopyrightLaw was not Designedfor Television
The increasingly restrictive regime of copyright law is captained by the music
industry. 113 Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, the judiciary had a fundamental belief
that public reception of radio was not a "public performance." 114 Courts cited the fact
that songwriters received adequate return from broadcasters for the use of their
music. 115 It is illogical and inequitable to alter the definition of "public performance"
to include the listener as a performer. 116 Unfortunately, once the public performance
definition left the judiciary for a legislative makeover, it became susceptible to the
117
changes demanded by special interest groups.
Congress rationalized its new public performance definition with a distorted
view of the Supreme Court's own dicta. 118 Based on the Jewel]-LaSalle and Aiken
opinions, which dealt solely with the use of radio, Congress produced a broad statute.
The scope of the statute extends to "an ordinary radio or television receiving
apparatus."1 19
Like the FMLA, the inclusion of television restrictions was of key interest to
royalty societies, such as ASCAP and BMI, who wanted control of their compositions
within television broadcasts. 120 However, the inclusion failed to appreciate the
fundamentally different business structures of radio and television.

1i:1See generallyLitman, supranote 109.
See Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929) ("One who manually or by human

114

agency merely actuates electrical instrumentalities, whereby inaudible elements that are
omnipresent in the air are made audible to persons who are within hearing, does not 'perform'
within the meaning of the Copyright Law."); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Elec., 16 F.2d 829,
829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) ("Certainly those who listen do not perform, and therefore do not infringe.").
15 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975):
[T]o hold that all in Aiken's position "performed" these musical compositions
would be to authorize the sale of an untold number of licenses for what is
basically a single public rendition of a copyrighted work. The exaction of such
multiple tributes would go far beyond what is required for the economic protection
of copyright owners....
Id at 163. Recent courts, even under the multiple performance doctrine warned of in Aiken, echo
this same sentiment:
Given the fact that a radio station (like "The Mix" here) has already
presumptively paid a licensing fee to play its music, small business
establishments like the Port Town Family Restaurant should not have to add to
that royalty. One would think that Lionel Ritchie, Billy Joel, the Eagles, and the
other artists here should be content with only one payment per performance.
Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 821 F. Supp. 1278, 1282-83 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
116 Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162-63. The court argues that a person innocently turning on the radio
would have no sure way of protecting against liability, short of keeping the unit off. Id.
117 See generallyLitman, supranote 109.
118 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976).
When Congress utilized Supreme Court case law, respective
of the case's controlling facts, it engaged in a dangerous legislative practice. Namely, it legitimized
unjust statutes by relying on manipulated common law interpretations.
119See 17 USC § 110(5)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
120 See Music LicensingHearings,note 84.
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B. Payment System

For radio and television to remain free, a copyright holder must sell certain
rights that grant the broadcaster use of the copyrighted work. 121 The broadcaster
then recoups costs and generates revenue by selling advertising time. 122 Prices for
both the copyrighted work and advertising time depend on the popularity of the
copyrighted work. 123 Measurement of popularity varies from radio to television.
Radio's primary source of data comes from public surveys, 124 while television's data
source is "Nielsen Ratings."1 25 The key difference is that Nielsen Ratings depend on
an electronic monitoring device attached to a television. 126 Thus, television ratings
give little weight to what a person actually watches, and instead monitor what a
12
specific television displays. '

121

See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 411-12 (1974).

The court explaining the

economic relationship of free television between the viewer, broadcaster, and advertiser:
Unlike propagators of other copyrighted material, such as those who sell books,
perform live dramatic productions, or project motion pictures to live audiences,
holders of copyrights for television programs or their licensees are not paid
directly by those who ultimately enjoy the publication of the material -- that is,
the television viewers -- but by advertisers who use the drawing power of the
copyrighted material to promote their goods and services. Such advertisers
typically pay the broadcasters a fee for each transmission of an advertisement
based on an estimate of the expected number and characteristics of the viewers
who will watch the program. While, as members of the general public, the viewers
indirectly pay for the privilege of viewing copyrighted material through increased
prices for the goods and services of the advertisers, they are not involved in a
direct economic relationship with the copyright holders or their licensees.

Id.
122Id.
12 3

ITd

See Radio Ratings, at http://www.slcc.edu/comm/telelab/radio-ratings.htm (last visited Aug.
13, 2004). Although television has grown on a national scale, much of today's radio programming
remains at the local level. Id. Companies such as Arbitron and Birch Radio specialize in conducting
121

local surveys. Id. See also RADAR and Nationwide."A Brief Guide to Understanding,Arbitron's
Network
Radio
Ratings
Services,
available
at
http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/RADARNationwideComparagraph.pdf
(last visited Aug. 13,
2004). Arbitron issues reports four times a year on national research of radio listeners. Id. The
listeners record their usage in a diary which is periodically collected for analysis. Id. The survey
sample can contain 400,000 diary keepers at any given time. Id.
125 See Nielsen Media,
What TV Ratings Really Mean (and Other Frequently Asked
Questions), at http://www.nielsenmedia.com/whatratingsmean
(last visited Aug. 13, 2004)
[hereinafter What Ratings Mean]. Nielsen Media Research uses a sample of 5,000 households of the
99 million television homes to electronically collect data from willing participants. Id.
The
measurements do not factor qualitative evaluations, such as a person's interest in a program, merely
if the program is being displayed. Id. Nielsen Media does employ the use of diaries, however their
primary role is to verify the electronic data. Id.
126Id. Nielsen Media Research calls this unit the "People Meter."
127Since the "People Meter" is a device installed on a home television set, all other viewing
outside the home is not captured, unlike radio surveys. See What Ratings Mean, supra note 125.
Even if the television is on, periodic flashing buttons appear, which must be pressed, to ensure the
person is still watching. Id.
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Although the majority of people watch television at home, sports broadcasting
128
tends to be an anomaly, generating an increased number of out-of-home viewers.
The NFL claims that this trend artificially decreases their television ratings, and
thus, their bottom line. 129 If any of the approximately 5,000 Nielsen monitored
televisions are supplanted by out-of-home viewing, the NFL's theory may hold true.
Furthermore, Nielsen monitored families are under no obligation to view programs
only on their home-monitored equipment. 130
The NFL's concern is purely
economic. 13 1 Artificially low ratings drop the price advertisers are willing to pay to

128

Although this Comment is unable to provide statistical backing, simple logic underscores

the point. Increased sports broadcasting has created what is commonly referred to as a "sports bar."
Likewise, there is no such thing as a "soap-opera bar," "evening news bar," or "prime-time evening
sitcom bar." The absurd sounding nature of the aforementioned concepts highlights a key point;
that many perceive one genre of television to be more enjoyable when watched on a television
outside of one's home.
129
Jeff
Simpson,
Copyrirht Challenge: Parties Get
Bowled
Over,
at
http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrjhome/2004/Jan-3 1-Sat-2004/news/23118853.html
(last visited
Aug. 13, 2004). NFL spokesman, Brian McCarthy defended the leagues cease and desist orders,
explaining that, "[w]hat's happening is that these establishments are charging admission for
something we provide for free ... [t]he viewers (at these events) are not captured in ratings. That, in
turn, hurts our advertisers." Id.
130 The author of this Comment contacted Nielsen Media Research to ask whether mass out-ofhome viewing could possibly have an adverse effect on ratings and whether safeguards existed to
prevent or record such activity. A research representative concluded that while there is no
indication that out-of-home viewers have altered the ratings, it stands as a possibility. Those
families randomly chosen to be monitored are free to watch television at bars or restaurants, and
such viewership is not recorded.
131 An examination of some of the numbers leading into the 2004 Super Bowl may shed light on
the NFL's actions. Since 1967, advertising rates have steadily increased.

Year

Cost Per 30-Second Commereial

2004
2003
2002
2001

$2,300,000
$2,150,000
$2,200,000
$2,200,000

2000
1999

$2,100,000
$1,600,000

1998
1997

$1,300,000
$1,200,000

1996

$1,085,000

See
Your
Cornueopia
of
Super
Bowl
Faets,
at
http://www.medialifemagazine.com/news2004/janO4/jan26/5 fri/news3friday.html (last visited Aug.
13, 2004) (citing Nielsen Media Research). Despite increasing advertising costs, television ratings
have been somewhat flat since 1999 with small spikes occurring with close games. Id.

Year

Ratinw

Share

2004
2003
2002
2001

41.4
40.7
40.4
40.4

63
61
61
61

2000
1999

43.2
40.2

62
61

1998
1997

44.5
43.3

67
65

1996

46.1

72

[4:125 2004]

Football's Intellectual Side

television networks on the presumption that fewer people will see their
commercials. 132 This in turn directly lowers the amount of money a network will pay
133
for the NFL's broadcast.

C. Assumption of Licensing
The 1976 Copyright Act limits the use of equipment in commercial
establishments. 134 The assumption was that the copyright owner would always be
willing to license the work if the proprietor was willing to pay. 13 5 While this has
historically been true for music licensing, 13 6 the economics of television dictate
otherwise.
The NFL believes that licensing of out-of-home viewings runs directly counter to
their business interests. 13 7 Even if Las Vegas casinos did pay a licensing fee, it is
doubtful the NFL could ever collect enough in fees to displace long-term losses in
network revenue from declining viewer ratings. 13 8 Instead, the NFL would ideally
See
Super
Bowl
TV
Ra tings,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/sports/nfl/longterm/2004/superbowl/tvratings.html
(last
visited Aug. 13, 2004). The question logically becomes, how long can television networks sustain
increased prices on advertising time in light of unchanged ratings? Although the copyright owner,
being the NFL, can not regulate the suspense of the game, they can try to influence where people
watch their broadcast.
See also Bowl Ad Prices Set New Record, available at
http://www.med.sc.edu:1081/superbowl2004.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
AdAge.com, an
advertising journal, cited "grumbling grow[ing] about the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of network
TV," as advertising sales slowed only weeks prior to the Super Bowl. Id. Although the game defies
market trends, there is overall "serious erosion among viewers" of broadcast television. Id. See also
Michael
Hiestand,
Super
Bowl
Hype:
Part
of
the
Game,
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/ football/super/2004-01-20-focus x.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
"CBS' main concern ... was getting the 'dramatic' financial boost of Super Bowl teams where it
owns local stations. CBS got one, in Boston." Id. Of the four cities to receive letters from the NFL,
Charlotte and Boston's respective football teams were competing, Houston was the hosting city, and
Las Vegas has been the traditional magnet where people travel to watch the game. These cities may
have been the most likely to see an increase in out-of-home viewings.
1:32See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 411-12 (1974) (Explaining the economic
relationship between the copyright author, the television network, advertisers, and the public).
133 1-d.

17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2000).
See United States v. ASCAP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23707, *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Music
royalty societies, such as ASCAP, may not deny a license "in order to exact additional consideration
for the performance thereof, or for the purpose of permitting the fixing or regulating of fees for the
recording or transcribing of such work... " Id. See also Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyrlrht,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 387-91 (2003). The idea that law currently embraces a laissez-faire
approach to intellectual property to promote the public good is debatable, but it was the cornerstone
of Madison's inclusion of Copyright law in the Constitution. Id. Copyright law was not intended to
be a strict property right, as applied to a land based economy, but a regulatory mechanism to reward
authors for enriching the public. Id. See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976). Although not
explicitly stated, the intention of expanding copyright law was not to prevent works from entering
the public, but rather to give authors greater power to secure payment. Id.
:36See ASCAP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *10-11.
137 See What Ratings Mean, supra note 125.
38 See Soonhwan Lee, D.S.M. and Hyosung Chun, M.S.S., Economic Values of Professional
Sport Franchisesin the United States, 5 U.S. SPORTS ACAD. 3 (Fall 2002), availableat
IM
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keep 1,000 people in front of 1,000 televisions rather than 1,000 people in front of
one, unmonitored television. 139 This model awards the author that can control the
demographics of his audience by dictating how and where free broadcasting is
viewed. 140 It means that the author benefits from forcing viewers to stay at home.

D. The New Role ofExemptions
When a business proprietor is eager to become a licensee, but the licensor is
unwilling to grant a license, the exemptions in 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) take on an added
meaning. 141 Instead of being the demarcation of what is or is not free, the statute
becomes the absolute boundary of liability, the point at which public liberties in free
broadcasting cease. Unfortunately, the proprietor must consider exemptions, which,
in addition to being unconstitutionally vague, fail to serve the public good.

III. INADEQUATE EXEMPTIONS IN 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)

A.

The Fairnessin Music LicensingAet

The NFL has stated that their broadcasts may not be displayed on a television
larger than fifty-five inches without authorization. 142 Although the fifty-five inch

http://www.thesportjournal.org/2002Journal/Vol5 No3/economic values. asp (last visited Aug. 13,
2004). The NFL signed a seven-year contract with four networks for the television rights of their
football games. Id. The total contract price amounts to $17.6 billion. Id.
Network
ABC (Mon. Night)
FOX (NFC)
CBS (AFC)
ESPN (Sun. Night)

Years Covered

A vg Cost Per Year

Total Cost

1998
1998
1998
1998

$550
$550
$500
$600

$4.4
$4.4
$4.0
$4.8

-

2005
2005
2005
2005

million
million
million
million

billion
billion
billion
billion

Id.
Considering an average yearly payment of $2.5 billion dollars, it is inconceivable that
commercial proprietors could generate enough in licensing fee to replace lost network revenue.
1:39See What Ratings Mean, supra note 125. The practice of monitoring equipment rather than
people fails to account for the simultaneous viewing of programs by large numbers of people. See
also Vegas Canceling,supra note 11. The Aladdin hotel casino Super Bowl party was to be held in a
7,000-seat theater. Id. The Orleans hotel casino expected 6,000 in attendance at its Super Bowl
party. Id. These two Las Vegas parties alone would place 13,000 people in front of two unmonitored
televisions. These numbers are significant in light of Nielsen Media Research's national survey pool
of only 5,000 televisions. Id.
110
Id. The NFL thus uses its copyright monopoly to selectively restrict public use in an effort to
influence the national broadcast television market. Id. While the NFL would be the beneficiary, so
too would the league's contractual partner, the television network, by helping to substantiate
increasing advertising costs. Id.
141 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) contains the fair-use exemptions for television and radio broadcasts
under the Home-Style Act and the Fairness in Music Licensing Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2000).
142 Vegas Canceling,s upra note 11.
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limit does originate from 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B), the law is generally inapplicable to a
143
sports broadcast.
In the absence of any judicial precedent interpreting § 110(5)(B), a proper
statutory interpretation is guided by the language itself, unless the legislative
history clearly indicates an opposing view. 144 Starting with the language itself, §
110(5)(B) exempts a public performance if the performance or display is by
audiovisual means and no such audiovisual device has a diagonal screen size greater
145

than fifty-five inches.
Despite the statute's lucid wording, the exemption is much more narrowly
146
tailored than one might suspect.

1. The Drafters

The most conspicuous evidence of the legislative intent behind § 110(5)(B) lies in
the identity of the parties present during the sessions that produced the FMLA. The
statute was drafted as an agreement between the National Restaurant Association
and ASCAP.147 Notably absent were any copyright holders of non-musical works.
Considering the parties involved, the drafters had a limited standing to negotiate
solely the licensing of music within radio and television. Although Congress enacted
the law, there is little evidence that Congress played any role in inserting its own
provisions.

143

148

See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18 (2004).

As its title implies, the Fairness In Music Licensing Act of 1998 is limited to the
realm of music. Specifically, the only works exempted under the provision added
by this amendment are nondramatic musical works. In this regard, the protection
is much narrower than Section 110(5) as originally drafted, which applies any
time a home-style radio or television is turned on regardless of whether the works
thereby affected are nondramatic musical or dramatic musical, or indeed
audiovisual or other works, such as the football games....
Id. at (C)(2)(b)(i).
M RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Because the Court
has no precedent to guide its interpretation of the AHRA, the Court begins its analysis with the
"familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Id. at 627-28. See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 210 (2003) ("In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the
authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill,
which represent the considered and 'collective understanding of those [members of Congress]
involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation."'); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76
(1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)); Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Poll, 124
F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102 (1980)).
145 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B).
116 See Music Lieensing Hearings,supra note 84.
'47 Id.

148 See 2-8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18 (2003). There is some contention as to whether the
House or Senate altered the provision concerning further transmissions to the public; however, it is
of little relevance. Id.
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2. The Testimony
The Congressional testimony relating to the FMLA clearly indicates that §

110(5)(B) was intended to apply exclusively to copyrighted music played over radio,
television or film broadcasts. 149 The limited scope of the FMLA is evidenced by the
150
lengthy Congressional hearings regarding the songwriters' interests.
During Congressional testimony, counsel for ASCAP, Mr. Frederick
Kaningsberg, made multiple references to § 110(5)(B) as it applied to radio and
television music. 151 In one statement, he remarked: "On the radio and TV music
front, the legislation would exempt any use of radio or TV music." 152 In another
comment regarding the FMLA, Mr. Kaningsberg stated: "the bill only, I think,
addresses the radio and TV music issue." 153

Finally, in a comment that directly

questioned the FMLA's restriction on fifty-five inch televisions, Mr. Kaningsberg
described the goal of § 110(5)(B) as having "the ability to be flexible and respond to
' 154
the needs of the users ofmusic and the needs of the songwriters."
The legislative language here is indisputable: the intent behind § 110(5)(B) is to
protect against the exploitation of a songwriter's property within a television or radio
broadcast. Thus, the NFL cannot claim injury under this statute because its
copyrighted work falls outside the narrow scope of the law. Furthermore, the NFL
lacks legal standing to enforce the law against Las Vegas proprietors.
Yet, declaring § 110(5)(B) inapplicable may not be entirely correct. Although the
Super Bowl is an athletic event, the televised program is filled with copyrighted
music. Most of the music is generated within the football stadium to rally the fans
during pre-game shows, in between plays, after touchdowns, during time outs, and at
post-game victory celebrations. The network adds a significant amount of music as
well, including network theme songs and jingles used when fading in and out of
commercial breaks. Outside of this, the broadcast only contains scattered moments
of a purely athletic event devoid of any music heard over the television. This implies
that songwriters of the performed works would have a licensing interest.
Thus, Las Vegas casinos could seek a license, but from the applicable licensor,
who would be ASCAP, and not the NFL. Ironically, the license would simply grant
casinos indemnity from whatever copyrighted songs the NFL broadcasts and that
were subsequently played on a television larger than fifty-five inches. 155 The link
between music and a songwriter's interest in a television's size is tenuous at best,

11 See Music LicensingHearings,supra note 84.
Id.
151Id.

150

Id. (emphasis added).
15:
3 d.
154 Id. (emphasis added).
152

155

See ASCAP, Frequently Asked Questions About ASCAP Television Licensing, at

http://www.ascap.com/licensing/tvfaq.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). An ASCAP license for
television use grants the user, "[t]he right to perform music in commercials and jingles ... [and a]n
indemnity if a claim for infringement is made against you, your staff or your advertisers based on
the performance of our member's works." Id.
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and is more likely indicative of the music industries' demagogic control over broad
56
aspects of copyright law.1
A license needed to display the NFL's broadcast is an entirely different license
altogether. In light of the NFL's unwillingness to license the event, the demarcation
of free-use and copyright liability is determined by the predecessor of the FMLA,
1 57
specifically, the Home-Style Act.

B. The Home-Style Act
The second exemption in § 110(5), under subsection (A), is known as the HomeStyle Act. 158 A case history of the statute uncovers a judicial lineage marred by
inconsistent holdings, 159 calls of unconstitutionality, 160 and eventual steps by
Congress to circumvent the statute's effect altogether. 161 Although the FMLA has
supplanted much of the Home-Style Act, the old law retains authority outside the
realm

of music.

162

As it

remains,

the

statute

should

be

struck

down as

unconstitutionally vague, indeterminable and discriminatory.

1. Void-for- Vagueness
The "void-for-vagueness" doctrine dictates that the government must enact laws
that allow a person of ordinary intelligence "to know what is prohibited, so that he
may act accordingly."1

63

When applied to civil statutes, courts use a lower level of

156See Music LicensingHearings,supra note 84. In arguments concerning the implementation
of regulations regarding screen size by ASCAP, one commentator noted that, "the primary
significance of the large screen is a larger picture, not more prominent music." Id. Despite this
lucid argument, ASCAP is able to limit television screen size. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B).
157 See generally17 U.S.C. § l10(5)(A).
158 Although the home-style exemption has been extensively employed as a fair-use defense to
the public use of music, judicial interpretations concerning the public use of television remain
extremely limited. At the time of this writing, there are no cases available in which a non-music
copyright owner (such as the NFL) has filed suit against a proprietor for the public use of
programming on a television, simply because the television screen was too big, or did not fit the
within the home-style exemption. This should not be confused with a number of cases regarding the
reception of "blacked out" football games. See e.g. NFL v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986).
159 See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.
160 See United States Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816, 817 (9th Cir. 1982) (explaining appellant Shoe
Corp.'s assertion that the home-style act was unconstitutionally vague); Merrill v. County Stores,
Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1164 (D.N.H. 1987) (explaining defendant's assertion that the Home-Style Act was
unconstitutionally vague and a lack of legislative history to make the law intelligible); Springsteen
v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (M.D.N.C. 1985) ("The meaning of [the homestyle act's] statutory language is far from clear, and its reach has scarcely been tested in the
courts.").
161 See generallydiscussion supra Part II.D. (discussing the 1998 Fairness In Music Licensing
Act).
1 2 The Home-Style Act covers the general use of radios and televisions in public settings. It
covers both audio and audiovisual broadcasts. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
163 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
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scrutiny, validating all laws that otherwise do not rise to the level of being "so vague
and indefinite as [to] really [provide] no rule at all."164
In 1982, BMI v. United States Shoe Corp. was one of the first cases to deal with
the scope of the Home-Style Act.165 It was also one of the first cases to defend the
constitutionality of the statute. 166 In succinct terms, the court held that the statute
was not void-for-vagueness because its requirements could be understood and applied
by a person of ordinary intelligence. 167 Twenty-two years of hindsight have proven
otherwise.
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values.
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague
laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application. Third, but related, where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of
[those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider
of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked.
Id.
104 See Columbia Natural Resources v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1108 (6th Cir. 1995). The statute
does not have to reach the level of "mathematical precision," however, it must dictate a standard of
conduct. Id. Bloomsburg Landlords Ass'n v. Town of Bloomsburg, 912 F. Supp. 790 (M.D. Pa.
1995). "Civil statutes which do not impact on First Amendment rights survive constitutional
scrutiny so long as they are not 'so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule at all' or are not
substantially incomprehensible."' Id.
165 See generallyBMI v. United States Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982).
166 Id at 817. "There is no merit in appellants' contention that the provision 'commonly used in
private homes' renders the Act void for vagueness. We believe that a person of ordinary intelligence
can understand and apply the requirements of the Act." Id.
167 Id. Assuming it would be reasonable to conclude that a federal judge is a man of at least
ordinary intelligence, able to know the limits of what a statute proscribes, consider Cass County
Music Co. v. Muedini, 821 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Wis. 1993). "When I heard this case in a summary
fashion at a scheduled default judgment hearing on February 2, I expressed surprise that the
situation as presented violated the law [and after reading attorney briefs] I am still not convinced
that the defendant has violated the law." Id. at 1280. The court concluded that "The Port Town
Family Restaurant's Realistic Model No. STA-700 AM/FM stereo receiver fits under this definition
[of an ordinary home-style receiver]." Id. at 1282. Compare this conclusion and interpretation of the
Home-Style Act with the holding of the appellate court in Cass County Music Co. v. Muedin, 55
F.3d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 1994):
[W]ith the 70-V transformer attached to each speaker, the nominal impedance
load level presented to the amplifier in the receiver is increased (from 8 ohms to
approximately 10,000 ohms), consequently allowing for the use of small and
moderate gauge speaker cable runs of up to 1000 feet without appreciable signal
degradation. Additionally, because of the implementation of the transformers in
the system configuration, the receiver effectively can power up to forty speakers
wired in parallel, thirty-six speakers more than the receiver was designed to
handle without overloading ....
The parallel wiring of the speakers allows for
easy installation of additional speakers at a later date. The set-up, known as a
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The Home-Style Act is intrinsically flawed because it does not contain any
language that can properly be considered "law." Instead, the statute commands a
person to determine the definition of the law on his own. This means a person must
accurately determine the size and configuration of the most popular home-electronics
equipment behind the closed doors of private homes. 168 Congress passed its burden
of determining the scope of the law to the citizen; and with that burden, a litany of
169
injustices.

2. Intrusioninto the Tranquilityof the Home
The Home-Style Act reeks of government-sanctioned intrusion into the privacy
of the home. The stark reality is that the phrase, "type commonly used in private
homes," is a variable that must be determined in order to define the boundary of
liability.170 The variable of this equation however, can only be accurately solved with
a neighborhood survey that asks people a number of questions regarding their
17 2
television sets.171 Pertinent questions could include: the kind of television used;

distributed 70-volt system . . . clearly is used beyond the normal limits of its
capabilities.
Id. The in-depth description of the radio's electrical capabilities stretches beyond what a person of
ordinary intelligence would be expected to know. Indeed, the court's analysis becomes extremely
tenuous when expert witnesses are relied upon to testify on the specifications of electrical devices.
This detailed level of technical scrutiny is notably absent from the statute and legislative history.
168See generally 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A) (2000). The law limits a person to a "receiving
apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes ...." Id. (emphasis added).
16 The vagueness standard becomes particularly important when it produces a chilling effect
on First Amendment protections involving free speech. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997)
(explaining that the vagueness of the Home-Style Act sets a "net large enough to catch all possible
offenders and leave[s] it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained and
who should be set at large. This . . . to some extent, substitute[s] the judicial for the legislative
department of the government." (citing United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876))).
The danger is that protected speech will be silenced as business proprietors err of the side of
caution or avoid speech altogether. See 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 410 (2004). (noting
that "reasonable certainty in statutes is more essential than usual when vagueness might induce
individuals to forgo their First Amendment rights for fear of violating an unclear law."). Such laws
that tread on First Amendment rights "cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully
drafted statute." ACLU 521 U.S. at 874. Although this occurred to some degree with the FMLA,
the Home-Style Act is still in effect in certain instances such as public performances.
170See generallyMusic Licensing Hearings, supra note 84. There was testimony regarding the
licensing practices of music royalty societies, and their diverging opinions on what is home-style.
"ASCAP and BMI take the position in various negotiations[,] or how they seek licensing fees[,] that
it's either a 27-inch TV set or a 36-inch TV set. The societies themselves don't agree." Id.
171See NFL v. Rondor, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (stating that, "The test
for determining whether an antenna system is 'common' within the meaning of [the home-style act]
is highly localized.") In properly applying the home-style act, the court notes:
In April and May of 1993, Mr. Hurray conducted a survey of the private homes
nearest defendants' establishments to determine the types of antenna systems
being used in those homes. Mr. Hurray conducted the survey first by inspecting
the defendants' antenna systems and then comparing those systems to those of
homes in the areas immediately surrounding each defendant's establishment. Mr.
Hurray conducted this survey on foot in seven (7) different municipalities,
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the size of the screen;173 how the set is configured; 17 4 how long cable wires extend; 17 5
and whether the television is on a table, mounted on a wall,16 or recessed into a
wall.177 The number of such surveys would increase as the number of businesses in a
given area increase.178 In addition, future reassessments will have to be conducted
due to fluctuations in the economy and technological advances that will alter the
17 9
definition of "home-style."
The burden of making such determinations runs directly counter to the
government's affirmative interest in protecting the tranquility of the home.180 Not
including Cleveland, Avon, Westlake, North Olmsted, Strongsville, Lakewood and
Fairview Park.
Id. at 1164.
172 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A) (2000). The receiver must be "common." Id.
173 Id.
'7 See BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324, 1329 (N.D. Ill. 1990). "A number of
courts have examined various models and configurations of receivers and speakers in order to
determine whether the sound systems are of a kind commonly used in private homes." Id. The
practice has become increasingly common in courts, to find a system not within the definition of
home-style because of its configuration, when indeed the court acknowledges each individual
component is otherwise home-style.
175 See Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enter., 688 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
A
speaker cable that was forty feet long invalidated the system as home-style. Id.
176 See BM, 949 F.2d at 1485 (finding speakers that were hung from the ceiling were homestyle). Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that four speakers
mounted within the ceiling were not home-style). Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F.
Supp. 1113, 1114 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that six speakers mounted on separate light poles were
home-style).
177 See Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1981). Four speakers that
were mounted within the ceiling were not home-style. Id.
178 See generallyHickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037-38 (D. Mont. 1990).
Defendant has the burden of showing that his radio system is home-style. Id. Any proprietor
wishing to avoid liability would have to conduct their own survey, at the very least, to show a good
faith effort in abiding by the law. Id. In Hitkory Grove Music, defendant provided a sworn affidavit
stating that their system was "commonly used in homes in the area." Id.
(emphasis added,
implying the localized nature of the survey).
17 Rapidly evolving technology ensures that the definition of home-style will never remain
static.
180 See Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1237-38 (10th Cir. 2004).
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of individual
privacy, particularly in the context of the home, stating that "the ancient concept
that 'a man's home is his castle' into which 'not even the king may enter' has lost
none of its vitality." [T]he Court again stressed the unique nature of the home and
recognized that "the State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and
privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized
society." One important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the unwilling
listener. A special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls,
which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions. Thus,
[the Court] has repeatedly held that individuals are not required to welcome
unwanted speech into their own homes and that the government may protect this
freedom. . . . The Court called the unwilling listener's interest in avoiding
unwanted communication part of the broader right to be let alone that has been
described as "the right most valued by civilized men." The Court added that the
right to avoid unwanted speech has special force in the context of the home.
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only should citizens be able to avoid intrusive surveys, but they should not be asked
8
to participate in a form of quasi-legislation based on their personal possessions.' '
Understandably, many people might refuse to answer such questions, making an
accurate 8 2 determination of the law nearly impossible.
Opponents might contend that since 1976 intrusive surveys have not been an
issue, citing the numerous cases involving the use of radios in commercial
establishments. Yet, the regularity with which defendants have been found liable
evidences that business proprietors forego such intrusive questions. Simple logic
supports this proposition. Imagine the shock of a homeowner being called or visited
by a stranger stating in so many words, "the law requires me to know what kind of
television you own. Is it an expensive plasma screen? Is it hooked up to a stereo?
And where is it located?"'' 3 A business proprietor is more likely to be arrested for
suspiciously canvassing a neighborhood than asking the embarrassing questions
required to determine the limits of the Home-Style Act.

3. The Discriminatory'Zip -Code" Effect
An ancillary effect of the Home-Style Act is that it allows copyright law to hinge
on the economic strength of citizens within a given community. 8 4 Because the homestyle test is "highly localized," 18 5 business proprietors located in affluent
Id.
In this sense, accurate must mean that it stands impervious to legal attacks. See Music
Licensing Hearings, supra note 84. If a plaintiffs own statistical analysis of home-style is more
impressive than the defendant's good-faith attempt, then the party with greater resources, time, and
area coverage may prevail. See Int'l Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
This is particularly true when plaintiffs, ASCAP, provided their own expert witness to testify that a
defendant's radio is not home-style. Id.
183 See BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc.., 754 F. Supp. 1324, 1329 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
[F]actors which courts generally examine include (1) whether the receiver and
other equipment itself is generally sold for commercial or private use; (2) the
number of speakers which the receiver can accommodate; (3) the number of
speakers actually used; (4) the manner in which the speakers are installed; (5)
whether the speaker wires are concealed; (6) the distance of the speakers from the
receiver; and (7) whether the receiver is integrated with a public announcement
system or telephone lines.
Id.
'81 See NFL v. Rondor Inc., 840 F. Supp. 1160, 1167 (N.D. Ohio 1993). Both plaintiffs and
defendant's surveys consisted of telephone interviews and visual inspections of immediately
surrounding neighborhoods. d. The court held that, "the information sought for this litigation can
best be determined from the actual viewing of residences and the type of external antenna attached
thereto." Id. at 1170. The defendant's survey was localized 420 homes in the 216 telephone area
code, and included the question of whether the residence owned a satellite dish. Id. at 1169. In the
plaintiffs survey, over four thousand homes were visually inspected. Id.
See also NFL v.
Ellicottville Gin Mill, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18583 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that the "plaintiffs'
survey[ed] ... Rochester television antennas, showing various boom and mast lengths."). Both cases
deal specifically with blacked-out football games and the antenna used to receive the broadcasts.
Both instances deal with equipment located outside the home. This implies that when the
equipment can be easily surveyed by visual inspection, the data will prove conclusive. Thus, survey
data involving radio or televisions, while more difficult to obtain, would prove just as conclusive.
185 Id.
Is'
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neighborhoods are afforded fewer restrictions than those in average or low-income
territories. In places like the "Hollywood Hills," the average home television might
be sixty inches measured diagonally, whereas in "Small Town," Nebraska, the same
may not be true. In this "zip-code effect," fair-use exemptions are directly correlated
to average disposable income in the neighborhood. The Home-Style Act thus
provides a luxury for some while discriminatorily denying others a similar benefit.
This effect egregiously offends the original intent of copyright law and fails to serve a
legitimate governmental purpose.18 6 The practical effect ignores the fundamental
reason for shifting copyright protection from common law to federal law.18 7 When
Congress preempted state copyright laws, they sought uniformity of application
across the nation.188 The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act could not be
clearer:
One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the
Constitution, as shown in Madison's comments in The Federalist, was to
promote national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of
determining and enforcing an author's rights under the differing laws and
in the separate courts of the various States. Today, when the methods for
dissemination of an author's work are incomparably broader and faster
than they were in 1789, national uniformity in copyright protection is even
18 9
more essential than it was then to carry out the constitutional intent.
Despite cases indicating the existence of the "zip-code effect," arguments that
the term "home-style" should be defined at a national level suffer from logical
inconsistencies as well. Who would determine the size of a national "home-style"
television? Projections made on external data, such as national retail sales of certain
televisions, would not adhere to the Home-Style Act. 190 As stated by one court, the
test is not what is "commonly available for use in private homes," but what is
"commonly used in private homes." 191 Sales data cannot account for this.
Furthermore, if "home-style" was determined to be a twenty-six inch television,
the FMLA fifty-five inch standard would become obsolete. Licensing of audiovisual
media is effectively split into its separate audio and visual components, which are
governed by drastically different laws. This problem is compounded when licensors,
such as songwriters and the NFL, do not share the same economic incentive to grant
licenses.
It becomes quite apparent that a business proprietor cannot realistically
determine the most commonly used television on a national scale. The plaintiff need
merely assert a claim of infringement, placing the affirmative defense of fair-use
upon the defendant. This becomes an insurmountable burden of proving that his

186 See H.R. REP.

No. 94-1476 (1976).

18Id.
188 Id.
189 ITd

190 Sales data accounts for what people buy, but not what is actually in peoples homes, as
required by the Home-Style Act. The new televisions might be accompanying an older smaller set,
may break or be returned, and may not have been purchased for home use.
191 See NFL v. Rondor, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
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television is the most commonly used device within private homes in the entire
United States.
Yet, at a local level, the Home-Style Act would become directly linked into the
local economy, fragmenting the fundamental purpose of shifting to a federal law and
discriminating against entire townships based on wealth. The Home-Style Act is
clearly void of any meaningful law. It vests legislative power in the consumer
electronics market and forces individual citizens to constantly be aware of those
trends in order to avoid liability.

4. JudicialInconsistency
Deficiencies in the Home-Style Act necessitate that federal courts interpret the
statute as a means of mitigating any uncertainties left by Congress. 192 Despite the
judiciary's best efforts to give meaning to the Home-Style Act, courts have
increasingly taken on a super-legislative role 193 that has destroyed the uniformity
sought in the 1976 Copyright Act. 194
In the statute's thirty-year existence,
independent courts have devised elaborate systems of analysis, yet never adopted a
"bright-line" rule. While some courts have noted that an otherwise "home-style"
radio system failed their respective tests because a speaker was mounted in a wall or
a speaker wire was longer than forty feet, 195 another court held that a system
involving speakers mounted on light poles dispersed throughout a 7,000 square foot
miniature golf course was, in fact, "home-style." 196 Such holdings have made an
already vague statute indeterminable. As courts apply what they believe was
Congress's intent, the judiciary has lost sight of their proper role:
Congress passes laws, not purposes. What matters is not some general
purpose that may have motivated the lawmakers but the means they chose
to achieve that end. The fact that [the courts] can conceive of a better way
of accomplishing what we think may have been the congressional purpose
197
does not give us license to ignore the means Congress actually adopted.

192
193

See Columbia Natural Resources v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1108 (6th Cir. 1995).
See BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324, 1333 (N.D. Ill. 1990).

The court

wrestled with ambiguities in the Home-Style Act, yet rebuffed opinions of other courts inventing
elements of the statutory test, such as business revenue. Id.
The court stated, "to elevate
[extemporaneous elements] to an importance equal or even greater than the factors enumerated in
the text of § 110(5) itself is to violate [the] principle [of] drawing on legislative history to formulate
,rules competing with those found in the U.S. Code."' Id. The court held that a legislative history
"may not ... be used to supply additional elements beyond those specified in the statute." Id.
194 The inconsistency of the home-style act has been well critiqued and widely accepted. For indepth analysis of contradictory cases see Litman, supra note 109; John Wilk, Seeing the Words and
Hearing the Music: Contradictionsin the Construction of 17 US. C. Section 110(5), 45 RUTGERS L.
REV. 783 (1993).
195See Music Licensing Hearings,supra note 84. See also 2-8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18
(2003).
196Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113, 1114 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
197 See Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 317 (9th Cir. 1988).
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The judiciary's thirty-year search for the elusive purpose of the Home-Style Act
has led to fragmentation along district lines.198
The judiciary continues to
procrastinate in addressing the vagueness of the statute while they wait for further
legislation, such as the FMLA, to circumvent the teeth of the Home-Style Act.
Although much of the public performance litigation pertaining to music may be
quelled by the FMLA, television broadcasters, such as the NFL, may decide to
capitalize on the ambiguity of the Home-Style Act, and reinvigorate its effect.

IV. IN SUMMARY
For the vast majority of business proprietors, these arguments hold true;

however, Las Vegas generally falls outside the statutory scope of fair-use. Most of
the targeted cease-and-desist letters involved projector screens generally measuring
twenty-feet diagonally. 199 It becomes easy to dismiss this use as patently violating
copyright law, and every year it becomes far easier to lose sight of a more basic
question: Is this fundamentally fair? For the past thirty years, courts have delved
into the minutia offered by expert witnesses 200 trying to quantify the "commonness"
of entertainment equipment. Perhaps no one remembers the some sixty years prior
to 1976, when public reception was not a public performance. 20 1 Indeed, the original
20 2
drafting of the 1998 FMLA tried to reinstate this concept.
Yet, we must remind ourselves that "[tihe immediate effect of our copyright law
is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor."203 For the NFL, the return
for their creative labors averages $2.2 billion per year in licensing of television
broadcasting rights. 20 4 This is undoubtedly fair, considering the general public
absorbs much of this cost. 20 5 Even if the NFL's theory of television ratings is true,
why should copyright law be the instrument that deprives the public in order to

198 See generallyBMI,754 F. Supp. 1324 (discussing differing court holdings regarding similar
elements of the home-style "test").
199 See Super Bowl Parties, at http://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/superbowl/parties.html
(Feb. 1, 2004) (providing a listing of all Las Vegas Super Bowl parties and the available amenities).
200 See Int'l Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652, 655 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (noting that
plaintiff provided an expert witness to testify on the features and power rating of defendant's stereo
system).
201 See Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964), "no person may
lawfully impose [a] charge upon the reception of commercial television broadcasts and every person
is free to receive such broadcasts by the equipment of his choice." Id.
202 Soo H.R. 4936, 103d Cong. (1994).
Section 110(5) of the title 17, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
[The following is not an infringing act. The] communication of a transmission
embodying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the
transmission by television or radio sets located in a business establishment,
unless a direct or indirect charge is made to see or hear the transmission.

Id.
203 Soe Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). (emphasis added).
204 See Lee and Chun, supra note 138.
205 See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 411-12 (1974).
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compensate for a company's process of collecting data?20 6 As stated, a copyright
grants a general right of exclusion, not a selective one.2 0 ' An author cannot
selectively discriminate when half of America simultaneously views his work on their
television sets.208 The inadequacies of § 110(5) must be addressed in order to resecure the lost fundamental rights of the public.

V. PROPOSAL

A. Summary of the Issues
The copyright monopoly on television broadcasts contradicts current public
interest and must be changed. Viewer rating systems have created an economic
incentive for television copyright owners to refuse licensing to public
establishments.20 9 Unfortunately, the only law available to prevent the overexpansion 210 of this copyright monopoly is inadequate. The FMLA was created
specifically to deal with music, and is thus inapplicable to a sporting event. 211 While
the Home-Style Act does apply to television broadcasts, it is unconstitutionally vague
and open to a myriad of opposing interpretations.21 2 The business proprietor's
perception of "home-style" is constantly vulnerable to a plaintiffs countervailing
analyses and surveys.21 3 Ultimately, however, a copyright should not be a license to
infringe on individual liberties by enabling its holder to dictate the size, place or
manner in which people enjoy free broadcasting.
The current definition of performance is overly-broad and thus should be
redrafted to strike a fair balance between the author and the public.

206

See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)(stating that "[t]he

sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly," this Court has
said, "lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.").
207 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.09 (2003). Selective exclusion enters a complex area of
law, in which a copyright owner's limited monopoly can be exercised in such a way as to commit an
antitrust violation. Id.
The issue arises "[o]n whether the copyright owner's enforcement of
exclusivity against some infringers but not against others without a valid business reason for the
distinction may constitute a violation of the antitrust laws." Id. at n2. (citing Metromedia Broad.
Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., 611 F. Supp. 415 (C.D. Cal. 1985)). This is significant in light of the
economic losses of only a few select business that were specifically targeted with a cease-and-desist
letter, compared to the myriad of other high profile parties that did not receive any warning.
208 Id.
209
210

See generallydiscussion supraPart III.A.
See Litman, supra note 109, at 903. The 1976 Copyright Act, heavily influenced by special

interest groups, "yielded a statute far more favorable to copyright proprietors than its predecessor,
containing structural barriers to impede future generations' exploitation of copyrighted works. The
legislative process may have struck an unwise balance .
Id.
I..."
211 See discussion supraPart IV.A.
212 See discussion supraPart IV.B.
213 See Int'l Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652 (stating that plaintiff employed
expert witness to testify as to what he believed was the most common technology).
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B. A Return to the Fairand FunctionalRules of the Supreme Court
Free broadcasting in public should not be considered a performance. Store
owners should not have to check if their equipment is "home-style" by calculating the
length of their speaker cable, measuring a speaker's ohm rating or measuring the
square footage of a building's useable space. 214 Providers of free over-the-air
broadcasts already are compensated adequately because of a well-balanced
relationship between television networks, advertisers, copyright holders, and the
public. 215 Use of a radio or television in a public setting does not upset this balance,
2 16
nor does it unduly take from the copyright holders.
When a party licenses its work for public broadcast, a public license must be
implied. Thus, when a radio or television show airs, it is implied that the public has
the freedom to receive the program on whatever equipment they choose, wherever
2 17
they want.
Successful implementation of free broadcasting requires the line drawn by the
Supreme Court between the broadcaster and viewer to be reinstated. 218 We have
2 19
been living in the world predicted by Aiken: a regime of inequitable copyright law.
Equity demands that the performance definition must be redrafted.

C. The ProposedPerformanceLaws

1. ProposedDefinition of'Perform"
Under 17 U.S.C. § 101, the definition of a performance must be changed. The
new definition should be in accordance with prior judicial holdings that broadcasters
220
perform while viewers do not.

21

215

See generallyCass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1994).
See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 411-12 (1974) (explaining the economic

relationship between copyright authors, television networks, advertisers, and viewers). See Lee and
Chun, supra note 138. The NFL is compensated $2.5 billion per year for television broadcasting
rights. Id.
216 See Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 411-12.
217 See Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964). "[N]o person may
lawfully impose [a] charge upon the reception of commercial television broadcasts and every person
is free to receive such broadcasts by the equipment of his choice." Id.
218 See id. at 162 (holding that viewers of television programs do not perform).
Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 409 (holding that the importation of distant cable signals by
local CATV (cable stations) is not a performance and thus subsequent viewing by individuals is
not a public performance). See also Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 398 ("Broadcasters perform.
Viewers do not perform."). Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty, Co., 283 U.S. 191, 199 n.5. (1931)
(noting that if the radio station had licensed the music broadcast, receivers of broadcast would
not be performers).
219 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 162 (1975).
220 See id. See also Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 409. See also Fortnightly Corp., 392
U.S. at 398. "Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform." Id. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle
Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 199 n. 5 (1931). (noting that if the radio station had licensed the music
broadcast, receivers of broadcast would not be performers).
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To "perform" a work means to recite, play, dance, or act it, or in the case of
radio or motion picture or other audiovisual work, to be the original
propagation point of a broadcast to the public.

221

Thus, examples of a performance would be: a person reading aloud at home, an
actor singing on stage, a band covering songs at a bar, a radio station broadcasting
music, or a cable network's national broadcast of a football game. While these are
examples of a performance, they are not all examples requiring a royalty payment.
Only a "public performance" would require such payments.

2. A ProposedDefimtion of 'PublicPerfurmance"
The new definition of a "public performance" should read as follows:
To perform or display a work "publicly" means:
(1) to perform at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its
social acquaintances is gathered; and
(2) to intentionally make the performance available to a substantial portion
of the surrounding audience.
Under this definition, a person at a restaurant who is reading a book aloud to a
friend at the same table is performing, but not publicly. Even if the person reading is
overheard by surrounding tables, it would not be a public performance. If this same
person were to stand up and read with enough volume so that a substantial number
of people in the room could hear the performance, it would be public and constitute
222
an infringing act.

Likewise, a television network would be performing publicly when it transmitted
a performance via radio wave. The transmission would be a "public performance"
because: (1) it was performed in public airspace and (2) was intended to be received
by a significant portion of the surrounding viewers. Liability would arise when the
223
transmitted public performance happened to be a copyright work.

221 Altering the definition of "perform" to include only the original point of propagation is the
key to balancing the interests of the public and authors. The intent is limit receivers of a

transmission from infringement.
222 Naturally, to avoid the vagary that plagues the current home-style exemption, it would be

necessary to define how many people constitute a "significant" number, and the bounds of the
surrounding area. Certainly a performance of a play in a closed room would be simple to define as
the majority. However, for broadcasts, the majority could be on the scale of half the American
population. So, in the case of broadcasting a transmission, the number would be extremely low, on
the order of fifty to one hundred. The significance of setting the number above one single person, is
to account for the rise of personal wireless technology, which under the existing performance act,

might constitute a transmission further to the public.
223 See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000). Under the basic tenants of copyright law, this means that the
transmitted work must have a modicum of originality and be fixed in a tangible medium. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102 (2000).
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3. The Return of the Audienee
Finally, there should be a statutory definition of an audience member.
To be an "audience" member means:
(1)To be the intended recipient of a performance; or
(2) In the case of signal broadcasts, to receive the performance and render it
in audible or visual form via radio, television, or any other device.
A person falls outside the definition of an audience member when:
(1)A person places a direct charge on another audience member to see or
hear the performance; or
(2) A person who receives the performance further transmits it to the public
in direct or delayed fashion.
Under this definition, people attending the Las Vegas Super Bowl parties would
be audience members to the broadcast. The broadcast was intended for the public,
there was not a direct charge to see the game, and the broadcast was not
224
retransmitted.
The proposed statutes would render much of 17 U.S.C. § 110 unnecessary. 225 In
particular, these laws would require the revocation of both the FMLA and the homestyle exemption.

VI. CONCLUSION

Copyright law has evolved greatly from its conceptual premise in the
Constitution. 226 Since copyright laws were first incepted, courts have been at the
forefront of the battle to interpret broad statutory language in light of new and
unanticipated technologies. In the last century, few other inventions have tested the
wisdom of our courts like the radio and the television; each capable of rendering a
singer's voice to listeners hundreds of miles away, those devices inevitably created
difficult challenges in defining the performance doctrine.
The definition of a public performance has followed a strange road. Influenced
and written by business interests before Congress, 227 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) has become a
puzzling statute that has isolated the public from the fair balance demanded by the
Constitution.

224

Since the new definition of public performance

allows for large screen viewings in

commercial establishments, copyright holders would not have standing to dictate how or where their
broadcast is rendered. This may have another positive ancillary effect; forcing large broadcasters to
pressure media rating services to alter their systems to conform with public demand.
225 Although the proposed revision of the performance definitions may appear
anarchistic in light of the current regime of strict copyright law, they are not entirely
wishful thinking. Consider the proposed Fairness in Music Licensing Act, as drafted in
1994. See H.R. 4936, 103d Cong. (1994).
226 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
227 See generallyLitman, supranote 109, at 903.

[4:125 2004]

Football's Intellectual Side

The solution does not lie in another exemption or reevaluation of the diagonal
screen size of a television. Congress must take clear steps to return to the equitable
rules forged by the Supreme Court. This means returning to the doctrinal dichotomy
of performer and audience and eliminating statutory language that defines
infringement based on consumer trends. Only then will copyright law truly be
consistent with the language of our Constitution.
"With these tips and a lot of creativity, you are on your way to giving a "Super"
Super Bowl Party. Relax, have fun, and enjoy the game!" 228

228

See Coward, supra note 1.

